Background Resource: The Crisis of Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return

October 2000

Internationally, few people are aware that the majority of Palestinians killed and wounded in clashes with Israeli soldiers are refugees. Most are young people born and raised in the over-crowded, poverty-stricken refugee camps strewn throughout the West Bank and Gaza. With little else but their bodies to use as political collateral, this community comprises the frontlines of the clashes now raging throughout the Occupied Territories.

This MADRE backgrounder on the condition of Palestinian refugees was written in September 2000, before the confrontations that began on September 28 of that year. Prospects for resolution of the conflict, explored in Section V., are clearly preempted by the current crisis. Yet today's violence underscores the fact that any political settlement that negates Palestinian human rights, including the right of return, will not be viable. We hope that this backgrounder helps to contextualize the current crisis and to strengthen the international community's commitment to Palestinian refugee rights.

Some Common Questions About Palestinian Refugees:

What are the origins of the refugee crisis?

As in Ireland, India and Cyprus, British colonial "divide and rule" tactics culminated in November 1947 in the partition of Palestine into two newly independent states -- one Palestinian Arab and one Jewish.
UN Resolution 181 allotted Jews, who were less than one-third of the population and owned only 8% of the land, 56% of the territory of Palestine. Palestinians saw the partition plan as a grave injustice, especially since most Jews in Palestine were recent arrivals. Fighting broke out between Jewish forces and local Palestinian militias.
In May 1948, the British evacuated Palestine, and Israel declared independence. Several adjacent Arab countries joined the war against the new state. By the war's end, Israel had captured 78% of Palestine and destroyed over 500 Palestinian villages. Nearly 800,000 Palestinians were made refugees.

Who are the Palestinian refugees? How many are there?

The United Nations defines Palestinian refugees as those people (and their direct descendants) who lived in Palestine for at least two years prior to 1948, and were displaced as a result of the 1948 war to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank or Gaza.
Official refugee status is limited to people who were displaced to these five areas where the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) was set up to provide humanitarian aid to the refugees.
This rather mechanistic definition excludes many others who were dispossessed by Israeli-Arab warfare and since barred by Israel from returning to their homes. They include: 1. Those displaced to areas outside of UNRWA's jurisdiction in 1948 (numbering one million today); 2. those displaced in the 1967 war (today, about 600,000); and 3. those internally displaced inside Israel (about 250,000 today).
These groups, plus the 3.6 million refugees currently registered with UNRWA, bring the number of refugees to about five million, or roughly 70% of all Palestinians.
Israel acknowledges only about two million refugees, discounting those not registered with UNRWA and contending that UNRWA figures are greatly inflated. This is one reason why we often hear conflicting figures for the refugee population.

What is the legal basis for the right of return?

The strongest legal basis is UN Resolution 194, adopted in 1948. It states that, "The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date...compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return."
Resolution 194 offers refugees a choice between repatriation (return to their homes) plus compensation (money paid for lost property), or simply compensation.
Resolution 194 has been affirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations nearly every year since it was passed. A total of eight other UN Resolutions have called for implementation of the right of return.
Major human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Hague Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and several regional conventions all support the right to return and compensation.
Finally, Israel's acceptance into the United Nations in 1949 was explicitly conditioned on its willingness to implement UN Resolution 194.

Hasnï¿½t the Middle East peace process supplanted old laws and resolutions?

The 1991 Madrid Conference, which opened the current peace process, was not convened under UN auspices, and the Oslo Agreements themselves make no mention of UN Resolution 194. Israel claims that it is therefore no longer bound by Resolution 194 or any other instruments that pre-date the Oslo process.
However, the Oslo Accords do base a permanent settlement on UN Resolution 242, which calls for "a just settlement of the refugee problem." Although no mechanisms for implementation are specified, the clause is interpreted by many as reinforcing Resolution 194.
More importantly, agreements between Israel and the Palestinian leadership do not invalidate international law and UN resolutions. These can be supplanted only by agreements that guarantee equal or better protection than current laws. Furthermore, agreements between occupying and occupied parties are legally invalid if they deny human rights to civilian populations, including rights to repatriation and compensation.

Why canï¿½t the refugees settle in the countries where they now reside?

An Israeli view: Palestinians are one of several groups (European Jews, Sudeten Germans, and Muslims and Hindus from the Indian subcontinent) who were displaced as a result of the century's wars. We don't hear these groups calling for return, so why should Palestinians be any different?
In fact, international law does support claims from groups like these for repatriation. But not all refugees opt to exercise repatriation rights. If we compare the situation of "ethnic Germans" displaced during World War II from CzechOslovakia to Germany, and Palestinians still crowded in refugee camps around the Middle East, it is not hard to understand why one group demands return and one does not.
The treatment of the refugees in most "host countries" has been dismal, ranging from denial of full civil rights to periodic massacres and expulsions.

Why canï¿½t the refugees settle in a newly independent Palestinian state?

Resettlement in a Palestinian state is not considered a substitute for the right of return because the West Bank and Gaza, where the state will be declared, are not the original lands of most refugees.
The UN Secretariat has repeatedly confirmed that the phrase "return to their homes," in UN Resolution 194 refers to the actual land of each refugee and cannot be interpreted to mean "homeland."
The fundamental crisis of the refugees is not only one of statelessness (though this condition has left them vulnerable to many abuses), but of dislocation from their ancestral lands.

Are refugees willing to live under Israeli sovereignty?

In a series of September 2000 hearings conducted by a British parliamentary commission, West Bank refugee organizations stressed local refugees' willingness to accept Israeli sovereignty.
Refugees' preference to return to their lands under Israeli rule rather than live in a Palestinian state can be confusing if we fail to consider that many refugees define their displacement as a cultural, historic and deeply personal dislocation. Their tie to their lands is not necessarily grounded in European notions of national belonging linked to citizenship in a particular state.

Would all the refugees return if they were able?

While the right of return is a collective right, the option to exercise it is an individual choice. No comprehensive study of the question exists, but many refugee rights advocates acknowledge that while some refugees will opt for return, many would prefer to resettle elsewhere.
Most refugees would likely base their decision on a combination of factors, including:
Their degree of social integration in the host country: In general, refugees are most integrated in Jordan, and least so in the Gulf countries.
Their quality of life in the host country: Jordan and Lebanon are usually considered the best and worst places respectively to be a Palestinian refugee.
The willingness of third countries to accept Palestinian immigrants: Some surveys show that many Palestinians would choose to resettle in the more economically secure western countries.

Are Palestinian and Israeli needs irreconcilable?

Many people in the US are familiar mainly with viewpoints that affirm Israeli positions on the Middle East conflict and ignore or distort Palestinian perspectives. This is not surprising since Israel is a key ally of the US and since the experiences of people on the "losing side" of history are often misrepresented. The special role that Israel has played in the US imagination has further overshadowed Palestinian perspectives. After the Nazi genocide, leaders in the US and Europe used Israel's founding to assuage Western guilt at having allowed the genocide to occur.

Although the project of creating a Jewish state predates the rise of Fascism in Europe, the establishment of Israel was used to symbolically reassert a moral order shattered by World War II and the murder of Europe's Jews. Israel did provide refuge for thousands of survivors whose homes had been burned off the map. But to tell the story of Israel's creation as a simple morality tale is to ignore a central truth: Israel was founded on the destruction of the indigenous Palestinian society, generating what is now the oldest and largest refugee crisis in the world.

Some people oppose the refugees' right of return because they think it means the dispossession of Jewish Israelis. Indeed, a "zero-sum" attitude towards human rights makes it seem as though the needs and rights of Palestinians and Israelis are mutually exclusive instead of deeply interrelated. This thinking is reinforced when the history of the conflict is portrayed only as a story about the Jewish need for refuge in the wake of genocide or only as a tale of Jewish aggression and Palestinian displacement. This either/or framework implies that to acknowledge one story, we must discount the other. But if the project of progressive politics is to challenge all instances of oppression, then we need to create a conversation complex enough to account for the distinctive histories and current needs of both peoples. Fortunately, a small, but growing number of progressive Palestinians and Israelis are working to develop models for resolving the refugee crisis in ways that acknowledge the rights of both groups and lay the groundwork for peace based on co-existence.

Refugees in the Host Countries

About one-third of all Palestinian refugees are dispersed in 59 UNRWA-run camps throughout Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Many of these camps suffer severe overcrowding, excruciating poverty, lack of sanitation and clean water, public health crises, high unemployment and a range of social problems resulting from displacement and repression. Heavily militarized borders, decaying infrastructure and clusters of unemployed young men standing around aimlessly give many camps the feel of a large prison. Even those refugees who live outside of camps tend to be the most marginalized sector of their host society, suffering discrimination, high rates of unemployment and restrictions on travel and movement.

Severe cuts in UNRWA health, education and welfare services have plunged many refugee camps into worsening poverty and strife. Rising illiteracy and school drop-out rates, the spread of hunger and infectious disease and a growing sense of hopelessness about the future are some results of the recent "downsizing" of the UN Agency. Moves by Israel and the US to dismantle UNRWA altogether would leave refugees with virtually no international protection, rendering them more vulnerable to accepting Israel's demands on Palestinian negotiators.

While Palestinians have been marginalized and abused in all host countries, the socio-economic conditions and human rights violations they endure vary greatly from country to country.

The Gaza Strip (800,000 refugees; about 22% of all UNRWA-registered refugees)

Gaza is one of the poorest, most densely populated places in the world. More than 75% of the population are Palestinian refugees. Since the 1950s the population of the camps has doubled, but their area has not been allowed to expand. In some camps today, more than 50,000 people are squeezed into less than half a square km. Many houses lack toilets and offer little protection from cold or heat. Per capita income is $800 a year. Health problems from poor sanitation and overcrowding are exacerbated by the lack of clean drinking water.

Since 1967, violence at the hands of Israeli occupation soldiers and a policy of forced economic under-development has made life for refugees in Gaza among the hardest in the region. Under the Oslo Accords, Israeli troops have redeployed from the refugee camps, but still patrol large areas of Gaza and control all movement in and out of the territory with lengthy and degrading checkpoint procedures. Since 1992, Israeli-imposed economic measures have further decreased the standard of living in Gaza by a staggering 46%. Unemployment hovers at about 30%.

The West Bank (600,000 refugees; about 16% of all UNRWA-registered refugees)

Although the West Bank has a stronger economic base than Gaza, refugees, who comprise 30% of the population, are among the poorest people in the area. Thanks to the Oslo Accords, most camps are now administered by the Palestinian Authority. Residents have experienced few improvements (and even some decline) in infrastructure and services, but are relieved to be rid of the daily humiliation and violence of Israeli soldiers patrolling their streets. Yet Israeli occupation practices continue to circumscribe refugees' lives. For example, Shu'fat Camp, in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem, suffers terrible overcrowding due to Israeli restrictions on Palestinian building in Jerusalem. As in the Gaza Strip, West Bank refugees have inadequate and sometimes no water supply for days and even weeks at a time because water is diverted to Israeli settlements.

Lebanon (382,600 refugees; about 10% of all UNRWA-registered refugees).

The harshest conditions for Palestinians are in Lebanon, where successive governments have treated them as unwelcome, destabilizing elements in the country's fragile religious and sectarian balance of forces. Palestinian refugees are barred from working in the public sector and from over 70 professions in the private sector, including medicine, law, engineering, and secondary and university posts. Even phone lines are forbidden to Palestinians in Lebanon. More than 50% of refugees live below the national poverty line. Lebanon's ban on construction in the refugee camps has resulted in severe overcrowding. In Ain al-Hilwa Camp, for example, apartments of 100 square meters house up to 18 people. Violence against refugees is a constant threat, reinforced by the memories of the 1982 massacres at Sabra and Shatilla Camps, in which 2,000 refugees were slaughtered and the 1985-1987 "Camps War," in which rival militias killed over 1,600 refugees.

Jordan (1,800,000 refugees; about 42% of all UNRWA-registered refugees)

The biggest concentration of Palestinian refugees is in Jordan, where they enjoy more political, economic and social rights than in any other host country (except perhaps the autonomous parts of the West Bank). Some refugees have been granted citizenship, though they are still discriminated against in the public sector. Unemployment is high - 20.8% compared to a national average of 14.7%. Yet many people believe that refugees, who make up about one-third of Jordan's population, are so well integrated here that few would opt to return. Camps in Jordan, while crowded and often poverty-stricken, have much better infrastructure and services than in other host countries.

Syria (432,000 refugees; about 10% of all UNRWA-registered refugees)

Palestinians in Syria have many of the same rights as Syrian citizens but are forbidden to vote, hold office, or carry Syrian passports. They are issued travel documents but these are not recognized by many countries. Only about 20% of Palestinian refugees in Syria still live in camps-- a measure of their social integration in the country.

International Instruments Supporting the Right of Return and Compensation

International instruments supporting the right of return

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art. 13(2): "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."
Fourth Geneva Convention (1950), Art. 49(1): "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of another country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. [...] Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased."
Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1963), Art. 3(1): "No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a national." Art. 3(2): "No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Art. 12(4): "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country" (This was ratified by Israel in 1991).
Economic and Social Council Resolution (1988), draft principles:

Everyone is entitled, without any distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, marriage or other status, to return to his country.
No one shall be denied the right to enter his own country.
No one shall be denied the right to return to his own country on the ground that he has no passport or other travel document."

Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), Art. 5: People of all race, national or ethnic origin have "The right to leave any country, including oneï¿½s own, and return to one's country."
The American Convention of Human Rights (1970), Art. 22(5): "No one can be expelled from the territory of the State of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it."
General Assembly Resolution 3236, (1974): Reaffirms "the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return."
The African Charter on Human and Peoplesï¿½ Rights (1981), Art. 12(2): "Every Individual...[is entitled]...to return to his country."
Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development-Based Displacement (1997), Art. 25: "All persons, groups and communities subjected to forced evictions have the right to, but shall not be forced to, return to their homes, lands or places of origin."
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989), Art. 16(1): "The people concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy." Art. 16(3): "Whenever possible, these peoples shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist."

International instruments that support the right to compensation

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art. 17: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." (The UDHR is not legally binding on member states, but establishes standards for human rights.)
Fourth Geneva Convention (1950), Art. 33: "Pillage is prohibited. [ï¿½] Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited." Art. 53: Destruction of "real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons... is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1954), Art. 1: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions."
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), Art. 5: Guarantees "the rights of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law ... [including] "The right to own property alone as well as in association with others."
The American Convention of Human Rights (1970), Art. 21(2): "No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law."
The African Charter on Human and Peoplesï¿½ Rights (1981), Art. 21(2): "In the case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation."
The International Law Associationï¿½s Cairo Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees (1986), Principle 4: "A State is obligated to compensate its own nationals forced to leave their homes to the same extent as it is obligated to compensate an alien."
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1994), Art. 27: "Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free and informed consent. Where this is not possible, they have the right to just and fair compensation."
General Assembly Resolution 51/129 (1996): "Reaffirms that the Palestine Arab refugees are entitled to their property and to the income derived therefrom, in conformity with the principles of justice and equity."
Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development-Based Displacement (1997), Art. 25: "All persons subjected to any forced evictions not in full accordance with the present Guidelines, should have a right to compensation for any losses of land, personal, real or other property or goods... Compensation should include land and access to common property resources and should not be restricted to cash payments."
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989), Art. 14(1): "The right of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized." Art. 14(3): Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession." Art. 16(4): If return to original land is not possible, "these people shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. Where the peoples concerned express a preference for compensation in money or its kind, they shall be compensated under appropriate guarantees." Art. 16(4): Persons "relocated shall be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury."

Cases in which the return of refugees and restitution have been granted

Former Yugoslavia ï¿½ The rights of Bosnian refugees to return to their properties, or to receive compensation if this was not possible, was enshrined in the Dayton Agreement of 1995. Refugee return was seen as an important factor in resolving the conflict.
Indigenous Peoples ï¿½ Indigenous peoples have reclaimed land in Canada, Australia, the United States and Central America. In Guatemala the Commission on the Rights to Land of Indigenous Peoples has been set up to return land seized by the government in the 1980s to those who were dispossessed and displaced.
South Africa ï¿½ A Land Claims Court was set up in 1996 to compensate or return land to those dispossessed by racially discriminatory laws during the apartheid regime.
European Jews ï¿½ Agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel and Jewish organizations allowed for the restitution of Jewish property and compensation following the Second World War. Claims have more recently been made on assets in Eastern Europe, and with the support of the United States government, Jewish restitution cases have been successful in claims against Swiss banks.

Israeli and Palestinian Negotiating Positions Regarding Refugees

The Oslo negotiations have generally been characterized by a gross imbalance of power favoring Israeli and US interests over the rights of Palestinians. In negotiations, the US has routinely pressured Arafat to agree to Israeli positions that are far below the minimum demands of the Palestinian people and that disregard international law and human rights standards. For example, at the summer 2000 Camp David Summit, Israeli and US proposals were based squarely on Israel's refusal to accept the refugees' right of return, despite the fact that this right is guaranteed under international law.

What is Israel willing to offer the refugees?

Senior Israeli officials report that Israel might release a "statement of regret" but take no legal or moral responsibility for the refugees.
Israel may allow between 10 and 100 thousand refugees to return as a "humanitarian gesture" under a family reunification policy. Implementation would probably be spread out over many years.
There would be no right of return for the vast majority of refugees. Instead, Israel would agree to the absorption of perhaps half a million refugees into the territory now administered by the Palestinian Authority.
The millions of refugees remaining in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria would be absorbed into those countries with the help of international funding.
Israel's contribution to this fund would be stipulated as fulfilling the demand for compensation, while the family reunification gesture would be stipulated as implementation of the right of return.
In exchange, Arafat would be expected to sign a document declaring an end to the refugee crisis, to the legal status of refugees and to any further claims on Israel.
These proposals are viewed by refugees as a program of forced resettlement. They were vehemently rejected by refugee activists during the Camp David Summit and, ultimately, by the PLO leadership.

What is the position of the Palestinian leadership?

The official position of the Palestinian leadership is the same as the refugees: the right of return plus compensation based on UN Resolution 194.
However, numerous individuals in positions of leadership, including Palestinian intellectuals, politicians, and even negotiators, have floated solutions based on a less literal reading of 194.
Most alternatives insist that Israel recognize the principle of the rights of return and compensation, but offer a willingness to negotiate specific modalities of a return.
Questioning the practicality of a literal interpretation of 194, University of Chicago Professor and former advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team Dr. Rashid Khalidi, speaks of attainable as opposed to absolute justice and of the importance of a formal Israeli acknowledgment of wrongdoing. Dr. Khalidi proposes reparations for those who won't be allowed to return and compensation for those who lost property.
Similarly, Palestinian Legislative Council Minister Ziad Abu Zayyad has distinguished between the right of return to the refugees' actual former homes and the right of return to a Palestinian "homeland," which he has argued, can be interpreted as the future Palestinian state.
Dr. Salim Tamari, a key negotiator on the refugee issue, has also spoken about the right of return as resettlement in a future Palestinian state, coupled with a return of at least "several tens of thousands" to their original homes through family reunification.
Arguing that human rights are non-negotiable, many refugee activists reject these proposals.

What does the international community say about the right of return?

Over the last two decades, the right of refugees to repatriation has gained ground globally. Today, it is generally accepted that when wars are over, refugees should be allowed to go home.
In fact, nearly every international peace agreement of the last quarter century has provided for the return of refugees, including in Vietnam, Guatemala, El Salvador, Rwanda, Uganda, Chechnya, Georgia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Cyprus, Namibia and East Timor.
The US-sponsored Dayton Accords is one example of a treaty that makes strong provisions for the return of people displaced by armed conflict (nearly two million Bosnians).
The main international sources of refugee policy, including the United Nations and the US Committee for Refugees, favor voluntary repatriation as the optimum solution for refugees and the best way to secure lasting peace and stability.
The guiding principle of any refugee policy is individual refugees' choice to repatriate, settle in their country of exile, or relocate to a third country.

What does the international community say about the right to compensation?

Property restitution — and when that's not feasible, compensation — is also increasingly codified in international law. Compensation and restitution rights have recently been recognized in Guatemala, Canada, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Kuwait and Europe.
The US Congress recently described the claim of the World Jewish Restitution Organization to property seized by the Nazis, as "a matter of law and justice."
Blueprints for implementing a policy of compensation for Palestinians are being developed by various non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental bodies, but much work still needs to be done to catalogue claims and determine the value of property taken over by Israel after 1948.

Why are Palestinians being treated differently than other refugees?

While each refugee crisis is unique, Palestinian refugees indeed should be treated according to the same standards and precedents as other refugee groups.
Currently, a main reason Palestinians are excluded from norms protecting other refugees is that their issue is being negotiated outside the framework of the United Nations or other bodies charged with upholding international law and human rights standards. The terms of these negotiations are set by the US and Israel (both notorious for violations of international law) and outcomes have actually perpetuated some human rights abuses against Palestinians (such as land confiscation and restrictions on freedom of movement).
The very fact that refugee rights, which international law defines as individual, inalienable and non-negotiable, are being subjected to negotiation, illustrates the weakness of the Palestinian position.

A Definition of Zionism

At the turn of the century, a small group of European Jews founded the Zionist movement, which combined historic Jewish religious and cultural attachment to the biblical "Land of Israel" with modern European notions of ethnic nationalism. Zionism asserted an exclusive Jewish claim to the land corresponding to the territory of Palestine. Successive Israeli governments have invoked this claim to displace the original Palestinian inhabitants. Those who remained in what became Israel in 1948 have been denied equal rights as citizens. Although Zionism has become the dominant ideology in Israel and in many Jewish communities abroad, it was a minority position amongst Jews until after the Nazi genocide. Some Jews, both in Israel and elsewhere, do not consider themselves Zionists, and some actively oppose Zionism. Zionists, then, are people of any nationality or religion who support a state with an exclusively Jewish character, even at the expense of Palestinian rights.

The Jewish debate over Zionism

The Zionist assertion of the need for a Jewish state is rooted in the history of European anti-Semitism. The idea was given powerful justification by the Nazi genocide, especially since most Jews who advocated alternatives to Zionism (Socialists who fought anti-Semitism as part of broader, integrated struggles against oppression) were murdered in the death camps. While Zionists often claim that the history of anti-Semitism proves the need for a highly militarized Jewish state, non-Zionists argue that the "us or them" mentality of nationalism need not be the singular lesson of anti-Semitism.

With the exception of the ultra-Orthodox Niturei Karta group, most Jews who oppose Zionism are progressives who care both about ending anti-Semitism and securing Palestinian rights. Unlike Zionists, they disagree that fighting anti-Semitism is a loosing battle. They reject the "siege mentality" of ethnic nationalism in favor of joining forces with other minorities and oppressed groups in struggles for social justice. For example, Jewish anti-Zionists have called for alliances between Jews defending Palestinian rights and Palestinians fighting anti-Semitism as part of larger common struggles against racism and regressive nationalism.

A Look at Israel's Opposition to the Palestinian Right of Return

Once the refugee issue finally emerged in the Israel-PLO negotiations, the US media began to pay some attention to the right of return. Because US interests are closely linked to Israel, and because, like refugees everywhere, stateless Palestinians have little to offer those who deal in power politics, we in the US have heard much more from the Israeli side of the debate. Although the issue of the right of return raises difficult questions, a closer look at Israel's objections reveals important flaws in the rejectionist position.

What are the main Israeli arguments against the right of return?

Israel did not create the refugee problem and is therefore not responsible for the refugees.
Israel absorbed Jews from Arab countries, so the Arab governments should absorb the refugees.
Israel lacks the land and water resources to absorb millions of refugees.
A return of refugees would lead to attacks against Israelis.
The return of refugees would pose an existential threat to the state of Israel.

Is Israel responsible for the refugees?

A Zionist view: Israel holds no responsibility for the refugees because they fled "voluntarily" out of fear in 1948, or at the behest of Arab leaders who called on them to evacuate while Arab armies fought the war.

This claim has been discredited by documents declassified from Israeli state archives that point to a concerted policy of expulsion in parts of Palestine.
Israel still denies any forced displacement in 1948. But it is undisputed that since the war, it has been official Israeli policy to bar the refugees from returning to their homes.
The refugees' right of return rests on this Israeli decision to deny them re-entry after the 1948 war. International human rights law recognizes that civilians often flee their homes in the face of impending warfare and protects the right of return whether or not a person's flight was "voluntary."
While the right of return is not legally contingent on an Israeli policy of expulsion, Israeli acknowledgment of this history is crucial to other aspects of reconciliation.

What is the "population exchange" argument?

A Zionist view: Between 1948-1956, 450,000 Jews immigrated to Israel from Arab countries where their families had lived for generations. Israel claims that this migration and the Palestinian exodus of 1948 constitute a "population exchange" that nullifies the Palestinian right of return.

However, no reciprocal exchange occurred. The vast majority of Palestinians were displaced to the West Bank and Gaza in 1948, not to the Arab countries from which Jews emigrated.
Some of the immigrants from Arab countries were persecuted by their governments, who were at war with Israel. Many lost all of their property. Israel (supported by the US) seeks to use Jewish property losses in Arab countries to mitigate Palestinian claims to property lost in 1948.
Notwithstanding the racist premise that "all Arabs are interchangeable," there is no relationship between the gains of those Arab governments that confiscated Jewish property and the losses of Palestinians.
Jews whose property was illegally confiscated have the same right to compensation as Palestinians and others. This is an individual right. The government of Israel is not entitled to lay claim to their property in order to reduce its debt to Palestinians.

Is it physically possible for the refugees to be absorbed by Israel?

A Zionist View: Many Israelis are familiar with a national study asserting that "Israel is the most densely populated country on earth"(Ha'aretz, 2/22/99). This highly politicized research has been used to argue that Israel lacks the land and water resources to absorb millions of refugees.

A more recent study, conducted by Israel's Applied Institute in 1999, explicitly refutes this argument, demonstrating that the developed area of Israel is only 6 percent (excluding the Negev desert, which is vast, but cannot support a large population). This research confirms that ample land is available for settlement inside Israel's 1948 borders.
According to studies conducted by Palestinian researcher Salman Abu Sitta, nearly 80% of Jewish Israelis live on only 15% of the territory of Israel, mostly in urban areas. The other 85% of the land, which is where most of the refugees come from, remains sparsely populated (by only about 154,000 rural Jewish Israelis). His research also confirms that there are sufficient land resources to support co-existence.
Water is scarce throughout the Middle East, no more so in Israel than in the areas where most refugees now reside. As a regional problem, the best way to address water scarcity is by governing conservation and distribution in the region as a whole. Such an agreement must come as part of a comprehensive peace settlement, which depends on a solution to the refugee problem. Rather than precipitating a water crisis, then, settling the refugee issue may be a pre-condition to developing sustainable water resource management in the Middle East.
If lack of water were an absolute deterrent to Israel accepting refugees, it would also have prevented the recent absorption of over 700,000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union. No Israeli claims of water shortages accompanied this desired wave of immigration.

Would a Palestinian return lead to attacks on Israelis?

Most Israeli opposition to the right of return stems from a straight-forward reluctance to jeopardize privileges that Jews currently enjoy in Israel (just as few people in dominant groups anywhere desire radical social change).
Of those who do fear violence, some simply believe that Palestinians are brutal by nature, by virtue of a "violent Arab mentality," or out of an inherent hatred of Jews.
Other Israelis fear that, because of the history of the conflict and the grave record of reciprocal violence, returning refugees will attack them in retaliation for past injustices.
Securing mechanisms to protect Israeli human rights alongside those of Palestinians is key to any resolution of the conflict. But Israeli human rights cannot be safeguarded at the expense of Palestinian rights (including the right of return).
The best way to protect people from political violence is not through the rule of law, but by eradicating conditions like poverty and discrimination that fuel humiliation and violence. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, retaliatory attacks, though attributed to past events, actually occur when injustices are ongoing. Rarely can people be mobilized to political violence when their basic material and social needs are met.
Some also argue that recognizing the right of return would defuse a primary motivation for attacks against Israelis by finally resolving the core of the Middle East conflict.

Would absorbing the refugees endanger the existence of Israel?

A Zionist View: An influx of Palestinian refugees would pose a "demographic threat" to Israel by quickly rendering Jews a national minority.

Indeed, the right of return raises central issues about the nature of the Israeli state.
Israel defines itself as a democracy, and in fact, some features of its political system are highly democratic. But like two of its main allies, the United States and Turkey, Israel is a very flawed democracy. Unlike other parliamentary systems, Israel does not define itself as the state of its citizens, but rather as the state of the world's Jews.
Under Israel's Law of Return, anyone who is Jewish can immigrate to Israel, be almost automatically naturalized and receive a package of rights and privileges that are denied to native-born Palestinians. Palestinians are effectively second-class citizens, suffering discrimination, rights violations and levels of poverty and unemployment double those of Israeli Jews.
The central contradiction of Zionism -- between the claim of Israeli democracy and the exclusively Jewish nature of the state -- would be greatly exacerbated were Israel faced with a non-Jewish majority, or even demographic parity between Jews and Palestinians. The Jewish population of Israel is about five million (the same as the high count of Palestinian refugees). Even if only a portion of the refugees were to return, Israel's demographic balance could be greatly altered.
If refugees returned but were denied full citizenship, Israel's democratic self-image would be shattered. But if refugees were granted citizenship, they could effectively challenge the exclusive Jewish nature of the state through channels of civic participation as legitimate as voting. This dilemma is the crux of Israel's refusal to recognize the Palestinian right of return.

Some "Big Picture" Solutions

The two-state solution

Many Zionists and non-Zionists alike believe that establishing two separate, independent states is the best way to resolve the middle east conflict and the refugee crisis. the two states are defined as Israel within its 1948 borders (or the territory it occupied until 1967, whose border is sometimes called the "green line") and a newly-independent Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza. Some point out that this option could allow Israel to maintain its jewish character and enable the refugees to be absorbed in Palestine.

Although many refugees support the formation of an independent Palestinian state, the vast majority rejects this idea of a "return" to the West Bank and Gaza because those are not the areas from which they were displaced. human rights standards and international law support the refugees' claim, but the political balance of forces, with Israel and the US weighing in heavily on one side, is against them.

Is the two-state solution a viable option?

Although Israel uses the word "state," to describe a post-occupation Palestine, the Oslo accords offer Palestinians such a compromised version of independence that the emerging polity will be a "state" in name only.

Within the framework of the accords themselves, Israel has crystallized its control over the West Bank and Gaza. Illegally-built Israeli settlements have been expanded into large blocs and a massive road network (directly funded by US taxes) has been built exclusively for Israeli settlers. Israel controls all travel between the West Bank and Gaza, and the territories themselves are truncated into dozens of isolated cantons, separated by Israeli-controlled areas. A maze of roadblocks and checkpoints is used to police Palestinian movement and to bar Palestinians from reaching their jobs, schools, hospitals and places of worship in Israel proper and Jerusalem. Even after Palestinian "independence," this "matrix of control" will continue to dominate features of Palestinian life that normally define sovereignty: the area's borders and trade, people's freedom of movement and travel, and nearly all security-related matters.

The Israeli doctrine of "separation"

For Israel, the primary appeal of the two-state option lies in its promise to separate Palestinians from Israelis. The idea is not new to Zionism, which, ironically, shares with anti-semitism the view that Jews and non-Jews can never live together peacefully: hence the need for a Jewish state. At first glance, separation seems like a reasonable alternative to the violence of daily contact between Israelis and Palestinians. But this violence is not inherent to proximity; it is rooted in Israeli domination of Palestinians. And domination, exercised through the "matrix of control" described above, is the means and the goal of separation.

Furthermore, the possibility of two separate, "ethnically pure" states envisioned by the two-state model does not reflect the reality of either territory. Israel has a Palestinian minority that comprises a full 20% of its population, and a smaller non-Jewish minority from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. The West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza are now home to over 350,000 Israeli settlers: close to 10% of the territories' population. Among Jewish Israelis, over 40% are of Arab descent. Were it not for polarized notions of identity created by the conflict, we might simply think of them as Jewish Arabs, just as we speak of Muslim or Christian Arabs. Israel also contains a minority of ultra-orthodox European Jews, who, because of their theological opposition to Zionism, identify as Palestinian. Clearly, there is no simple homogeneity here in which national identity corresponds neatly to geography.

What alternatives are proposed by progressives who criticize the two-state and separation models?

With the reality of the Oslo process fast foreclosing any equitable two-state option, small numbers of Palestinian and Israeli progressives have begun resurrecting older models for co-existence in one state, encompassing the areas of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.

A "bi-national state," modeled perhaps on Belgium or Switzerland, would include both national groups. Each would run its own affairs through an autonomous government (perhaps on the model of Nicaragua) and have the right to practice its own religion, traditions and language. An overarching common government would deal with matters of concern to both groups, such as economy, shared resources and foreign relations.

In a "secular democratic state," people would not be grouped politically according to identity. Rather, this model resembles the ideal of western democracies - a pluralistic, one-person-one-vote polity, where people's relationship to the state is based on citizenship, not ethnic, religious or national identity.

Bi-nationalism holds the potential for modified expressions of Zionism by politicizing ethnic and religious identities in the state. Secular democracy, on the other hand, would relegate religion and ethnicity to purely private realms, leaving few vestiges of the current "jewish state."

By developing new models of cultural autonomy (bi-nationalism) and citizenship (secular democracy), these proposals offer progressive alternatives to the ethnic nationalism that informs both Zionism and parts of the Palestinian national movement.

How much currency do these ideas have?

Only a small minority of Israelis or Palestinians currently considers these options desirable, much less viable. Most Israelis are not interested in jeopardizing the gains or the perceived security of Zionism; and after 36 years of Israeli occupation, most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are looking for less, not more contact with Israelis.
Yet the gradually growing debate about these options represents some of the most democratic and creative thinking ever undertaken about the conflict. Some therefore believe that, in contrast to the current Oslo process, these models may hold the seeds of a truly sustainable peace.
Right now, there is little optimism about the short-term prospects for either bi-nationalism or secular democracy. But given the fast-paced and dynamic political culture of the region, ideas that sound utopian today may be quite feasible in the foreseeable future. Fifteen years ago, only a small minority of Israelis supported the formation of an independent Palestinian state. Today most do. And not long ago, most Palestinians equated the right of return with the dissolution of Israel. Today the Palestinian leadership, and the majority of Palestinians themselves, have moved away from this position.

Ultimately, models of bi-nationalism or secular democracy will be relevant only if they succeed in guaranteeing Palestinians the rights they have been denied for so long and offering Israelis modes of political participation and identity that are preferable to Zionism.

What is MADRE's Position?

MADRE as an organization does not advocate one model over others for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our criteria for any solution are that human rights standards and international law be respected. That means that any two-state solution should be based on UN Resolution 242, which guarantees "respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area." Any single-state option should be based on UN Resolution 181, which, unlike the Oslo Accords, guarantees both groups, "equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights."
MADRE as an organization also does not advocate any one solution to the refugee crisis. While we recognize the various ideological and material complexities of the conflict, these do not negate the Palestinian right of return. No country is entitled to preserve its ethnic majority by violating international law and scorning UN resolutions.
MADRE believes that Palestinians have the same rights to repatriation, compensation and international protection as other refugee groups worldwide. MADRE also believes that, as in other cases of historic injustice, the starting point for reconciliation is Israeli recognition of violations of Palestinian rights followed by the formulation of concrete policies to redress injustices.
MADRE's point of view is underscored by our critique of any form of ethnic nationalism; by our support for Palestinians and Israelis who recognize the need for a solution based on justice; and by our determination to change US policies that perpetuate conflict and human rights violations.

Thawing the impasse over the right of return

There are still no sustainable, comprehensive proposals for implementing the right of return. This lack of practical solutions reflects a long-standing political impasse. Because Israel has refused to recognize the right of return even in principle, sufficient efforts have not been made to develop concrete solutions. And because viable and equitable scenarios for return have not been presented to the Israeli public, few Israelis have diverged from their government's rejectionist position.
Similarly, because refugees have been stonewalled by Israel's refusal to respect their rights, they've had little incentive to think beyond maximalist demands towards solutions that account for the permanent presence of Israelis.
The emergence of concrete solutions, then, depends on accepting the principle of the right of return. Conversely, accepting the principle requires a leap of faith that concrete solutions are possible.
Here the role of peace and refugee rights activists is crucial.5 These groups are beginning to develop solutions with the power both to demonstrate to Palestinians that their rights can be realized in co-existence with Israelis, and to offer Israelis assurance that a Palestinian return need not be implemented at their peril.

On implementing the right of return

MADRE does not take a position on a specific way to implement the right of return, but we are encouraged by new efforts to develop concrete and sustainable policy proposals.

Some people suggest that refugees repatriate to their original lands in Israel, but that their citizenship be diverted to the newly independent Palestinian state. This separation of residency from political affiliation could have its counterpart in the Palestinian state, where some Israeli settlers might remain after independence.
Some Israelis, particularly poor and working class families, may opt for compensation packages that would enable them to relocate to improved housing, thereby accommodating returning refugees. Much work still needs to be done to resolve those cases where returning refugees lay claim to a specific house where Israelis live and want to remain.
Finally, some refugees have expressed willingness to relinquish their actual property in exchange for a different piece of land in their original village.

MADRE's support for local activists

More than any particular proposal for resolving the conflict, MADRE is encouraged by the efforts of our Palestinian and Israeli partners and friends, who are working towards co-existence based on equal rights.
For example, programs of the Ibdaa Cultural Center in Deheishe Refugee Camp enable young refugees to develop the vision of a society they want to live in and the skills to work towards its realization.
In discussions with Israeli peers, these young activists affirm that co-existence is possible, as long as it's on the basis of equality rather than domination. They understand that no solution is viable that advocates the forced displacement of Israelis. In the words of one Ibdaa member, "we would have learned nothing from our own history if we turned around and made Israeli families into refugees."
Conversations at the Ibdaa Center often revolve around difficult questions, at once visionary and concrete, such as, "how will you interact with your new Israeli neighbors once our right of return is realized? What kind of schools do you want to have? What kind of neighborhoods?" And the most central question of all, "What ways can you think of to share your lands with those who also have no other country but this one?"

By Yifat Susskind, Communications Director